Adolf Hitler back at the Wolfschanze (1944)

At 'Wolfschanze,' Hitler began the New Year once again, fired with optimism. He had convinced the German people to stand fast in the face of the adversary, and through their iron will and fortitude, he promised them victory. In front of his war staff, he radiated that same confidence and instilled them with fresh hope and strength of mind.

But whatever assurances he gave them, the month of January brought nothing but a string of all the familiar problems. By 15 January, news reached the headquarters that the Red Army had unleashed their much-awaited winter offensive against the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts in Army Group North. The German 18th Army faced an enemy that outnumbered them by at least 3:1 in divisions, 3:1 in artillery, and 6:1 in tanks, self-propelled artillery, and aircraft. By the morning of 18 January, the fronts east of Oranienbaum and west of Leningrad were collapsing. The same was happening at Novgorod, where several German units were being encircled.

The Russian Second Shock and Forty-Second Armies then joined the attack against Army Group North. Along the Baltic coast, some German elements escaped, but the Russians trapped and destroyed many as they swept in from the east and west. At Novgorod, eight Soviet divisions encircled five German battalions. Their one hope was to escape annihilation by hiding in the swamps west of the city. As heavy Russian artillery pulverized Novgorod into oblivion, the Forty-Second Army attacked toward Krasnogvardeysk and began battering the German units defending the town.

The 18th Army was beginning to disintegrate. Fighting in mud and swampland, the troops were exhausted. On 23 January, Pushkin and Slutsk were evacuated. General Küchler, the new commander of Army Group North, appealed to Hitler for a complete withdrawal. During the evening conference, Hitler thundered at his generals and responded angrily, prohibiting all voluntary withdrawals and reserving all decisions to withdraw for himself. However, a few days later, after the 18th Army had incurred more than 50,000 casualties, Hitler approved a retreat to the Luga River but directed that the front be held; contact with the 16th Army regained, and all gaps in the front closed.

On 31 January at the noon conference, Hitler informed the Army Group North commander, General Küchler, that he was relieved of his command. Model, who had been waiting to replace Manstein, was given temporary command of the Army Group. Many of the commanders in the field, including the soldiers, looked upon Model as the Führer's troubleshooter. It was Model who ordered his "Shield and Sword" policy, which stated that retreats were intolerable unless they paved the way for a counterstrike later. Out on the battlefield, Model was not only energetic, courageous, and innovative, but he was also friendly and popular with his enlisted men.

Now commander of Army Group North, he was given the awesome task of trying to minimize the extent of the disaster that was about to loom along the Baltic. It was here in the north that Model had the greatest opportunity to display his talents as an improviser. He immediately sent out an order to all commanders in the field that they were not to step backward. The commanders were also instructed to uphold the Führer's demands that troops build defense lines where they were stationed and fight to the bitter end.

On 23 February, Hitler and his headquarters staff left for Munich, while the Todt labor force moved in to begin what became known as the last and final phase of the construction program on 'Wolfschanze. ' Plans had been drawn up to erect even stronger bunkers to safeguard the Führer and the rest of the inhabitants of "Wolfschanze" from aerial attacks.

When Hitler arrived on the Obersalzberg, it was snowing. Camouflage netting covered the Berghof, and the sunlight was restricted through the famous windows of the great hall. Most of the staff found life at the Berghof as isolating as at 'Wolfschanze.' Hitler, however, appeared more relaxed.

On 30 March, the Führer sent his Condor aircraft to Lwow to collect two field marshals. Just before the evening conference, Hitler met Manstein and handed him the Swords to his Knights Cross and announced that he had decided to place the Army Group in other hands. For the arduous task ahead, he had chosen Model as the most suitable candidate to take charge of the Army Group. Both Hitler and Manstein shook hands and departed. Model was already waiting outside with General Kleist's successor, General Ferdinand Schorner.

A week later devastating news arrived at the Berghof. The headquarters had been monitoring closely the escalating fighting in southern Russia, and on 8 April a grim and bloody battle began to rage in the Crimea. Zietler appealed for a withdrawal, but Hitler flatly refused to permit the evacuation from the peninsula. Despite Schorner's new appointment to southern Russia, events were now moving faster than Hitler's orders. At the General's command post, he sent word to the Berghof that a bold, fierce, all-out attack by thousands of Red Army troops had begun and stormed and penetrated the Sevastopol fortress. By 8 May, supreme headquarters reluctantly conceded defeat, and Hitler ordered the evacuation by sea of the 17th Army.

Hitler was becoming increasingly uneasy about German intelligence services picking up radio traffic regarding an imminent Anglo-American invasion, while the Eastern Front offered no reassurances of stability from the growing might of the Red Army. By late May and early June, German code-breaking radio monitors were still deciphering endless BBC radio traffic to the OKW. It was believed that Normandy and Brittany would be the probable landing site, but only as a diversionary tactic prior to the main operation across the straits of Dover.

When Hitler finally retired from his midnight conference during the early hours of 6 June, he did not suspect that a giant armada of 5,000 ships laden with the enemy was at that very moment approaching the coastline of Normandy. By the time Hitler awoke at 9.00am, the Battle of Normandy was already in full swing. In his dressing gown, Hitler was handed the latest reports and sent for Keitel and Jodl. When they arrived, he was annoyed that the various command centers were unaware of exactly where the main invasion strike would take place. Both Keitel and Jodl, and indeed many of the General Staff, were convinced that the Normandy landings were a diversionary tactic prior to the main landings at Calais. It was for this reason Hitler dared not throw everything he had in France into the Normandy battle.

By 10 June, the atmosphere at the Berghof deteriorated further as reports revealed that the enemy could not be contained along the shores of northern France. A week later, with the Battle of France escalating on the night of 16 June, four Focke-Wulf Condors flew Hitler and staff to France, while the entire Luftwaffe along the way was grounded and antiaircraft batteries were ordered to cease firing. The next morning Hitler's motorcade drove to ‘Wolfsschlucht 2,' an unused Führer headquarters between Soissons and Laon.

Work had begun on the complex in late 1942. The main part of the site comprised a railway tunnel that was fitted with armored sliding doors that retracted into the rock walls. Large bunkers were built into the hillside, and the walls and ceilings were up to 3.5 meters thick. The main bunker constructed was the Führerbunker. This building had a 90-square-meter hall and dog kennels. A flight of stairs led down to a bomb-proof air-raid shelter.

The whole area was heavily defended by guards of the FBB. Control posts, field patrols, and fixed sentry points ensured that there would be no unauthorized entry into the compound. At fixed intervals there were armored vehicles and MG34 and MG42 machine gun posts. A ring of anti-tank and anti-aircraft battery emplacements protected both the ground and air from possible attack. Seven heavy anti-aircraft batteries, each equipped with the deadly 8.8cm FlaK gun, surrounded the headquarters and were supported by twenty-one light and medium AA emplacements and eighteen searchlight batteries.

The headquarters had telephone and telex circuits, and each operator served a switchboard that could manage nearly 100 connections. The telephone system was ample for the temporary use of the site.

When Hitler arrived at the heavily guarded enclosure, he met Rommel and Rundstedt. With total frankness, Rommel briefed Hitler on the overwhelming threat of the Allies and the dwindling forces in Normandy. The troops, he said, were defending courageously, even the seventeen- and eighteen-year-olds. However, given the enemy's overwhelming strength, the front would likely collapse within days. Whilst Rundstedt briefed the Führer on the situation, an air raid warning forced an adjournment to the underground concrete bunker. Rommel once again continued to discuss the deplorable military situation, and then they took a brief break for lunch. To the astonishment of Rommel, during lunch, two SS guards stood over the Führer, testing his plate of rice and vegetables before he would take a bite. This was visible proof of Hitler's distrust of the officer corps.

Hitler's visit to ‘W2’ lasted less than twenty-four hours, and within a couple of days, he was back at the Berghof. At his mountain retreat, he was torn between staying in Bavaria to oversee developments in France or returning to ‘Wolfschanze’ to fight the war in the East. Yet, a few days later on 22 June, the third anniversary of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, he received worrying reports that the Red Army had marked the occasion with the largest offensive of the war. The attack was so great that supreme headquarters were thrown into total confusion. Within a week, Army Group Centre was almost decimated.

General Busch reported that the 9th Army was significantly damaged with high losses, the 4th Army was retreating, and the 3rd Panzer Army was in a critical state with one corps left out of its original three. The entire front of Army Group Centre had been pierced in numerous places, and although considerable numbers of troops were trying to hold their defensive positions, they were unable to avoid the encirclements. Nevertheless, Busch was determined to execute the Führer's Operations Order 8, which had demanded that all three armies immediately stop withdrawing and hold a new line due north and south of Berezina. Busch quickly ordered the three armies to halt, but the damage to them was irreparable.

With nothing but a string of defeats, Hitler decided to finally replace Busch with Field Marshal Model to instill new vigor and restore determination in Army Group Centre. The change in command pleased many of the commanders in the Army Group. Many of them had been bitter over the developments that had shaped the leadership of Army Group Centre. General Nikolaus Vormann, for one, who had replaced General Jordan as Commander-in-Chief, received the news with "satisfaction and renewed confidence." 'Many of the commanders in the field, including the soldiers, looked upon Model as the Führer's troubleshooter.

He had been the commander who first introduced the ‘Shield and Sword’ policy on the Eastern Front in early 1944, which stated that retreats were intolerable unless they paved the way for a counterstrike later.

On 15 July, Hitler returned once more to the ‘Wolfschanze.’ He discovered that the installation had changed significantly, particularly in Security Zone I, when he arrived. Many of the previous wooden structures had been replaced with brick and concrete reinforced structures. Thousands of tons of concrete had been poured into these buildings, and they had paid particular attention to reinforcing Keitel, Göring, and the Bormann bunkers. Other buildings were also given additional concrete and bricks to help safeguard them against possible aerial attacks.

Hitler's bunker had still not been completed, and all his furniture, including the bed and office, was moved temporarily over to the Guest Bunker. The Guest Bunker was roomy, but not to Hitler's liking, and he could not sleep properly. During the day he could hear Todt workers with pneumatic drills and other tools, but when he left his bunker to stroll across to the conference room, he was regularly seen to stop and chat with the workers, asking them about the progress.

Although Hitler was seen to look outwardly calm and at ease, those closest to him had seen a gradual change in his physical and mental state. At the war conferences, he felt agitated and downcast, and the soaring summer temperatures worsened his condition. Due to the heat, the temporary hut, known as the Situation Barrack, had its two partition walls knocked down to create a long makeshift conference room to allow more light and air to pass through the open windows. The hut measured twenty-five meters by five meters and was large enough to accommodate more than twenty officers for a conference.

On 20 July, the first conference of the day was scheduled to commence at the regular time of 1.00pm, but the officers attending were informed late that morning that it was to be brought forward thirty minutes, as Mussolini was expected after lunch.

The conference began without incident at 12:30pm with the assembly of twenty-four officers. The windows of the hut were left wide open, as the heat that day was oppressive and Hitler was determined to have the conference completed in a rapid time so that he could meet his Italian ally at the headquarters train station.

The conference had only just begun with the outlining of operations to the Führer when General Fromm's chief of staff, Colonel Schenk von Stauffenberg, arrived to brief him on some new divisions. Minutes later, as Heusinger was concluding his brief, there was a blinding flash followed by an enormous explosion, which ripped through the hut, sending Hitler flying into a door and killing and badly injuring a number of those who were standing around the map table.

Outside the situation barrack, there was mayhem and confusion. Several officers in the vicinity thought the headquarters were under enemy attack. An alarm was sounded, and RSD and RBB troops came running to the hut. A message was immediately relayed to the Führer's Anti-aircraft Detachment, which manned the anti-aircraft batteries throughout the installation. The early-warning system integrated the entire area in and around 'Wolfschanze,' including the other headquarters installations, allowing the staff to quickly determine whether the headquarters were indeed under any type of enemy aerial attack.

When the RSD received word that there had been no attack on the installation, it was immediately presumed that the explosion was a bomb. As a standard security measure, there was a "total lockdown," and all gates and guardhouses were instructed not to allow anyone to pass out of the headquarters. Telephonists were forbidden to use the switchboards, and everyone was to remain where they were for interrogation.

As Hitler left the conference hut shaken by what appeared to be an assassination attempt, an investigation team was immediately sent out to search the site for more hidden bombs. The headquarters received orders to bring tanks, other armored vehicles, and a unit of Waffen-SS troops to increase security.

It was not until later that evening that a report was received that Colonel Schenk von Stauffenberg, who had attended the conference, had bluffed his way out of the headquarters and hurriedly made his way to the airfield bound for Berlin. The report indicated that authorities suspected Stauffenberg had planted the bomb in his briefcase with the intention of killing the Führer. Along with several prominent officers, Stauffenberg planned a military revolt in Berlin to try and overthrow the Nazi regime. By late evening the report concluded that the revolt had been successfully stopped and the ring leaders, including Stauffenberg, had been killed or arrested.

Despite evidence of his injuries, Hitler still attended the evening war conference after reading the report at 10.00pm. He began the conference by telling his war staff the sad loss of the two stenographers who were killed by the assassination attempt and then turned his full attention to defensive operations on both the Western and Eastern Fronts.

Reports indicated that the Waffen-SS and Wehrmacht divisions continued desperately to try to keep the Allies in check all over the Normandy sector. Events on the Eastern Front were equally grim. During the last week of July, the Russians had pushed forward and rolled across the ravaged countryside of Poland, breaking through the shattered German front.

Throughout the remaining days of July and August, the headquarters continued to devote considerable attention to the deteriorating situation on the Eastern and Western Fronts. Whilst they watched the enemy battle across French soil against many well-seasoned, well-dug-in, determined German troops, the headquarters was nevertheless prepared for the worst.

During the first half of August, it was clear that the Battle of France was collapsing. Much of the conference dealing with operations in the West consisted of ways to avoid complete obliteration. General Walter Warlimont and others pressed for an immediate withdrawal from France altogether, while Jodl was more cautious, stating that a general withdrawal from the coastal sector would be better.

The Normandy campaign had been very costly for the Germans, with many of its elite units annihilated. Despite massive losses, the campaign in the West, like those in the East, showed that the Germans could only delay the enemy, not defeat them.

In front of his generals, Hitler was annoyed by the military situation on both the Eastern and Western Fronts. As the Anglo-Americans drew ever closer to the Homeland, out in the east from the Baltic to the Ukraine, Red Army offensives had routed or surrounded battle-fatigued German divisions. In the north, Hitler was particularly insistent that his forces try to defend the Baltics for as long as possible, knowing that East Prussia could soon be threatened.

By the first half of October, the headquarters was once again busily monitoring events transpiring in Poland. The German Army had been ordered to defend Poland with everything they could muster. As a result, the fighting withdrawal had been a grueling battle of attrition for those German divisions fortunate enough to escape the slaughter and build new defenses in Poland. The bulk of the forces left to defend the frontlines had become exhausted and undermanned. With reserves almost nonexistent, old men and low-grade troops bolstered the dwindling ranks.

Struggling to find more manpower, convalescents and the medically unfit—known as ‘stomach’ and ‘ear’ battalions because most men were hard of hearing or suffered from ulcers—were also drafted into the ranks. Poland, it seemed, would be defended at all costs, despite the age and quality of the soldiers manning the lines. Hitler was so concerned that these thinly held lines would break at any moment that he decided to drag himself away from his sickbed to try and instill some kind of fanaticism in his weary commander's blood.

As the battle intensified in Poland, news from the Baltic about the impending threat to East Prussia caused fear at the headquarters. Hitler decided it would be safer to move into Bunker 11, even as he tried to downplay the growing concerns about a Russian invasion of East Prussia. Here in his newly rebuilt bunker of dormitories and offices, which had its own compressed air and oxygen supplies, including air conditioning for U-boats, Hitler directed the last phase of the defense of the Eastern Front.

On 25 October, as further fighting escalated in East Prussia, Hitler told Bormann he would never leave ‘Wolfschanze’ until he had mastered the crisis there. Almost daily now, there were sightings of enemy aircraft in the area around Rastenburg, but the flak positions kept them away. An atmosphere of dread prevailed in the headquarters, especially among Hitler's more junior staff and the female secretaries. The Führer assured them that the troops were doing everything possible to safeguard against the collapse of the Eastern Front and that there was nothing to worry about.

As Hitler tried to convince his weary staff that he could hold back the Russian onslaught until after the winter of 1945, he turned his attention to the Western Front during the situation conferences. For some weeks Hitler had been considering a grand plan to stem the Anglo-American drive along the borders of the Reich. Over in his new bunker, he had surveyed with Jodl the first drafts of a secret plan to attack the West. To ensure absolute secrecy, only a handful of people were told of the daring offensive. The officers who knew the plan were sworn to silence, and no details were to be communicated via teletype or phone.

Hitler and his military advisors knew the offensive was risky, but they had no choice. During early November, the Führer spent considerable amounts of time working on the plan. Jodl would regularly walk over to Führerbunker armed with plans and other important data, and both men would work in a spacious outer room that had large windows and a view of the forest and meadows.

On 10 November Hitler signed an order to prepare for what became known as the Ardennes offensive. A week later he surprised his staff by telling them that he now had decided to leave the headquarters so that he was able to watch the Ardennes campaign more closely. Although Hitler maintained the pretense of returning to 'Wolfschanze,' he knew it would be far too dangerous. However, despite the danger, he ordered the construction workers to continue as though he would one day come back.

At 3.15pm on 20 November, Hitler and his entourage left ‘Wolfschanze’ for the headquarters station and boarded ‘Brandenburg’. Before the train took the Führer to the Western Front, he was advised to make a visit to Berlin first. By 5.30am, the train arrived at Berlin's Grunewald station, and within the hour, his motorcade reached the Reich Chancellery, which showed unmistakable signs of having come under attack by air raids.

Hitler and staff settled down in the Chancellery, and on 22 November Hitler surprised Keitel by instructing him to make preparations so that ‘Wolfschanze’ would not fall into enemy hands and be destroyed. A detonation calendar for all the bunkers and huts was drawn up, and it would be left to the Führer to give the final order, codenamed 'Inselsprung,' for the destruction of his old Eastern Front headquarters.

While Keitel instructed a group of pioneers to prepare for the detonation, Hitler suggested that he might still return before a final decision was made to blow up the installation. It was a clear indication that the Führer could not bring himself to destroy the very place where he first ventured to plan and oversee the invasion of the Soviet Union. In his eyes the destruction of ‘Wolfschanze’ would bring about a realization that the Eastern Front was indeed doomed forever.