Adolf Hitler - The Road to Destruction (1942–1943)

With Bock's sacking, Hitler prepared to transfer his headquarters staff from ‘Wolfschanze’ to a newly constructed headquarters site deep in Ukraine. On 16 July 1942 at 8:15 a.m., his entire staff left ‘Wolfschanze’ and flew in sixteen planes to the new installation, which was situated six miles north of Vinnitsa, just east of the Vinnitsa/Shitomir road.

Already, the 1st Rifle Company of the FBB, followed by the 4th Heavy Company, 5th Panzer Company, and Flak Regiment 604, comprising eight batteries, was sent to the Ukrainian headquarters ahead of Hitler.

By midday, Hitler arrived and was greeted by an assorted collection of wooden huts, very different from the concrete bunkers at ‘Wolfschanze’.

The site was called ‘Anlage Eichenhain’ (Camp Oak Grove), but upon Hitler's arrival he rechristened it ‘Wehrwolf. The site itself was constructed at considerable cost and covered nineteen hectares of woodland. Scattered across this area were nineteen blockhouses together with Luftwaffe and RAD huts for the headquarters staff and security force.

Other buildings consisted of a communications center, hutments for personal adjutants, Wehrmacht adjutants, Keitel and Jodl, Chief of Army Staff, Martin Bormann, secretaries, shorthand writers, generals, guests, servants, orderlies, and guards. There was even a teahouse, a cinema, a bath sauna, and a barber. A swimming pool had also been built. Three small air-raid bunkers were constructed as well. One feature that was very different from any other headquarters built was an extensive underground sentry post network for the FBB.

Power to the buildings was supplied by a substation. Three diesel generators in a specially constructed building stood ready to supply electrical power if there was any electrical failure. Much of the site was covered with overhead wiring and ground cables for both the substation and diesel generator house. Water supply was delivered by two 120-metre-deep wells that had been bored into the ground. Hydrant water was drawn from the River Bug and pumped into a large tank. Sewage from the installation was drained into a special purification plant inside the headquarters, and miles of pipe and drainage channels led all the way to the Bug.

Work on the Ukraine headquarters had begun in November 1941, and some 8,000 Organization Todt workers, together with 1,000 Russians, were drafted in to construct the first phase of the site. Following its completion, the site looked quite pleasant. However, Hitler and staff hated the place.

Nonetheless, Hitler had not come to Ukraine to enjoy the surroundings but to direct the German offensive against the Red Army in the south. To help direct the campaign, part of OKH also came to Ukraine from its Mauerwald headquarters and was quartered in Vinnitsa on the edge of the town. At 'Wehrwolf,' Security Zones I and II were only a few hundred yards apart in the open woodland.

For the next three months, Ukraine became the forced residence of Hitler and his staff. Each evening everyone had to swallow anti-malaria tablets. At night, it was frigid inside the log cabins, while during the day it was hot and stuffy. The warm air was said to be stifling, and the heat added to the daily rows that were to emanate in the days that followed. Everyone longed for rain and cool weather.

From this new command post, Hitler watched with anticipation as the German summer offensive unfolded. He was optimistic that his forces would soon capture the city of Stalingrad.

Throughout July, the climate at 'Wehrwolf' was stifling. Hitler soon began developing headaches, and these symptoms in turn markedly affected his relationship with everybody, contributing to the constant arguments and the condemnation of his generals, which were to reach unprecedented heights in the weeks to come.

During the second half of July, much of Hitler's time was taken up with the developments in southern Russia. During a conference held on 17 July, Hitler received word that two of Paulus's divisions had entered the town of Bobovskaya on the upper Chir. Hitler then immediately ordered that the 6th Army move to the Don bend and hamper any enemy forces that were preparing to build defenses west of the Volga. A few days later Paulus received another order from the Führer to take the 6th Army to Stalingrad and capture it by high-speed assault. Paulus, however, did not have adequate reinforcements. His troops too had been marching continuously for almost two weeks and were totally exhausted. But nonetheless, he made a determined effort to drive out defenses of the 62nd and 64th Soviet armies.

During August, Hitler watched with optimism as news of German forces on the Don poised to strike across the west bank of the Volga. The drive towards the Volga was almost unhindered by the enemy. By about four in the afternoon on 23 August, reports confirmed that the first German troops had finally reached the banks of the Volga, north of Stalingrad. The push on the city now ensued.

In spite of the growing resistance in and around Stalingrad, Hitler was still seen to be optimistic. However, his health once again worsened. The hot weather coupled with his deteriorating relationship with his generals reached unprecedented heights. Gradually, through the rest of his stay at 'Wehrwolf,' he began to convince himself that his generals were at the root of all the problems that had escalated on the Eastern Front. Keitel often took the brunt of Hitler's negative mood. Already unhappy in his post, Hitler considered replacing Keitel with Paulus as soon as the general had captured Stalingrad. He also reiterated his intention to sack Halder, who had annoyed him more than anyone else in his general staff. General List too was another officer that Hitler could no longer tolerate. During August he had become so perturbed that he told Halder that List was to be summarily removed from his post so he could take command personally of Army Group A in the Caucasus.

By September, Hitler's suspicions of his generals had escalated to the point that, after a violent argument with Jodl, he decided that his orders would never again be disputed or perverted during the conferences. In the future, all briefing conferences will now take place in his hut. A team of Reichstag stenographers was immediately flown out from Berlin to Vinnitsa to record every word that was spoken during the conferences.

In spite of Hitler's insistence that every word be taken down during the war conferences, this did not deter his general staff from rowing. For hours Hitler continued blaming his generals for the stagnation on the Eastern Front and often threw himself into an impassioned tirade in which Halder was made accountable for the military defeats.

By 17 September, during another bitter argument, Hitler finally said he could no longer tolerate Halder and decided to relieve him of his command. A week later Halder was replaced by a forty-seven-year-old commander named General Kurt Zeitler. He arrived at 'Wehrwolf' on 23 September, where he met the Führer at the midnight war conference. Afterwards, Hitler spoke to Keitel about Halder's sacking and told him in no uncertain words that he ardently believed that with Halder's replacement he had finally stamped out the last barrier of defiance at the supreme headquarters. Now with a new chief of staff, a spirit of National Socialism would flourish, flooding fresh young blood into an exhausted German army.

Reassured that he had finally found the right chief of staff, Hitler left 'Wehrwolf' on 27 September to make another speech in Berlin. Within days, the Führer returned to Ukraine, where the normal routine of the day continued more or less as before. However, at the war conferences, the staff noticed that there was an atmosphere of calm. Unlike Halder, Zeitler was treated with the utmost friendliness, and even Jodl became favorable once more. Together, they managed to organize the daily military operations in both the Eastern and Western theaters to the Führer's satisfaction. Zeitler was considered to be Hitler's most prominent tactical advisor and effectively took control of the Eastern theater, while Jodl advised on the coastal defense of Europe and other defensive operations in the Western theater. However, their characters at the war conferences were entirely unique. Unlike Jodl, Zeitler was strong-willed and did not take kindly to wild accusations from his Führer, and as a result of the new Chief of Staff's nerves of steel, his position at the headquarters was firmly secured.

By mid-October, the weather at 'Wehrwolf' began to change significantly for the worse. Freezing rain would soon bring snow, and this prompted Hitler to announce that he intended to leave Ukraine for East Prussia. On 1 November, the entire headquarters staff returned to ‘Wolfschanze.’ When the staff entered the East Prussian headquarters, they noticed that new buildings had been built. Many of the buildings that had previously been erected out of wood were now covered with brick walls and their ceilings lined with concrete to protect them against a possible enemy bomb attack.

Particular attention was made to protect the Navy liaison offices, a second officer's mess, Jodl's offices, Göring's offices, a cinema, the wooden annexes to the Führerbunker, the Keitelbunker, and the army personnel office. Once these buildings were reinforced with brick and concrete, the outer surfaces were camouflaged with paint and foliage and covered with netting to try and conceal them from aerial observation. A Polish laborer working in the installation called Peter Werbewry said that some of the new buildings were heavily reinforced with concrete ceilings measuring a depth of two meters.

Other buildings constructed were a sauna for the officers and a new tea house erected near Kasino. Additionally, there was a guest bunker, several barracks and bunkers for the SS-Begleit Kommando, and accommodations for the officers of the RSD. There was a structure built for the stenographers, and a fence topped with barbed wire surrounded it.

Hitler and staff immediately settled down to their normal routine at the East Prussian headquarters. The events at Stalingrad dominated much of the war conferences. Already thousands of German soldiers had been killed or wounded fighting for the city. Although Hitler appeared confident as ever in front of his staff, there were deep concerns that the battle would not end as quickly as initially thought. Over the following days, the soldiers of the 6th Army were slowly drawn into a heavy, protracted battle of massive proportions.

Along the streets, across the roads, and inside houses and factories, the Russians defended every position to the last bullet. Even when they found themselves cut off on an island of rubble, there was still a stubborn refusal to surrender. German troops would spend entire days clearing a street due to the enemies' relentless resolve to fight to the death. Although by late September both sides were exhausted from continuous combat, the Germans were very close to gaining control of the southern part of the city.

Throughout October, the headquarters followed the unmistakable signs of an army being drawn into a protracted, urbanized battle of attrition. Reports confirmed that units were pushing forward into the city and resuming their relentless battles. They fought and tried to survive through the rubble, twisted steel from factories, shattered and burnt-out wooden houses, cellars, sewers, trenches, and holes.

During November, as the battle intensified, the atmosphere at Hitler's headquarters became bleaker than ever. Virtually the whole of Hitler's time was now consumed by trying to win the battle of Stalingrad. Stressed and fatigued by the fighting, Hitler would drag himself to the conference room and listen intently to see if the fighting had stabilized in his favor.

The days leading up to Christmas 1942 were a somber occasion for Hitler and staff as they watched Paulus's troops become cut off and surrounded at Stalingrad. The Führer no longer joked or smiled, and much of his time was spent discussing the depressing possibility of watching his 6th Army choke to death in Stalingrad. During the conferences Hitler was rarely polite and appeared increasingly agitated as each day passed. His anxiety led to more arguments with his commanders.

Christmas at ‘Wolfschanze’ passed with little cheer, and even Hitler's intimate staff could not bring him out of his depression. Hitler believed that Paulus's men were safe inside the encirclement's 'fortress' and could hold out until spring 1943, despite his commanders pressing him to order the 6th Army to break out. He had ordered Göring to increase the air supply to at least 300 tons a day and thought that the amount would be sufficient for the 6th Army to survive. But the situation was far worse than Hitler could ever have imagined. His 6th Army was slowly being starved to death. The kessel had become littered with thousands of dead, and those still holding out were edging towards total obliteration.

The first bitter days of 1943 opened up as they had 1942—with the German Army facing total catastrophe on the Eastern Front. In the south, where the Germans and allies had deployed the flower of their forces six months before, they were now weakening daily. The Germans, exhausted by huge losses, saw a virtually intact Hungarian army stretching along the Don as probably the only Axis partner capable of holding the Russians in 'check.' Along a greatly extended defense line, the Germans supplied the Hungarians with as much equipment as could be mustered.

In the conference room, Hitler sat there listening to nothing but a string of problems as the situation in Stalingrad reached new heights. As the headquarters debated on ways to relieve the 6th Army from its entombment, the Russians were already preparing to wipe out the pocket once and for all.

By lunchtime on 10 January, ‘Wolfschanze’ began monitoring reports of a massive Russian attack on the southern and western sides of the Stalingrad pocket. As a result of the attack, both the Germans and the remnants of their allies suffered enormous casualties. Hitler told Keitel that he had no doubts that the air of disaster was unanimously approaching. But he still obstinately refused permission for Paulus to break out of the city.

As the last agonizing days unfolded in the city's ruins, Paulus learned on 30 January that the Führer had promoted him to Field Marshal, fully aware that no German soldier of that rank had ever surrendered. In front of his general staff, Hitler said that he had finally found a brave gentleman who would keep the last bullet for himself and would never capitulate to the Soviets.

However, on the morning of 31 January at 6.15, the radio operator at Paulus's headquarters sent a frantic message indicating that Soviet troops were closing in on the command post. Minutes later, a German officer emerged from the command post and waved a white flag at the approaching Russian soldiers. Paulus had finally surrendered.

Two days later, at 8.40 in the morning of 2 February, the last German pocket in Stalingrad finally surrendered. General Strecker's XI Corps had fought courageously for days but was unable to avert the situation decisively. As Strecker's exhausted and starved men shuffled pitifully through the snow into captivity, the Russians rejoiced. The battle of Stalingrad, the war's most protracted and bloodiest conflict, finally ended abruptly.

After the defeat at Stalingrad, the atmosphere at ‘Wolfschanze’ changed forever. Hitler too became a picture of gloom, and nobody, not even his trusted female secretaries, could lift him out of his despondency. Those who visited the headquarters during February and March 1943 found the staff depressed and anxious about the coming months. Even those who attended the military conferences found the atmosphere more miserable than ever before. Hitler would often acknowledge his commanders just with a glacial stare and then murmur to either Keitel or Jodl to proceed with the conference.

General Heinz Guderian, who hadn't seen the Führer in a while, was shocked by both the supreme headquarters' pessimism and Hitler's appearance. In Guderian's opinion, Hitler's physical and mental state clearly showed signs of alteration. During the military briefings he noticed that Hitler was frequently objectionable if one of the staff officers proposed anything that he did not agree with. When arguments broke out, he would sometimes stagger to his feet and hurl abuse at the general staff and insult the officer that he was speaking to.

Once he had concluded the conference, he would leave and retire to his badly ventilated bunker and sit and brood. With his intimate circle, however, he remained uncharacteristically distant and hesitant in his conversation but never lost his temper. For this reason, Hitler stopped inviting guests at mealtimes, preferring to eat alone or with his secretaries, who were under strict instruction not to mention the war.

In spite of the reverberations caused by the loss of Stalingrad, Hitler was still fixated on gaining the military initiative in the East. Throughout early February, Army Group South had been desperately trying to hold its receding front lines, but many units had already fallen back in disorganized retreat across southern Ukraine. Perturbed by the receding front in southern Russia, Hitler, during the evening conference on 16 February, announced his decision to go to the front and take over command of Army Group South. With him he would take just Jodl, Zeitler, Schmundt, Hewel, and Morell. By early next morning, Hitler's motorcade left ‘Wolfschanze’ for the Rastenburg airfield, bound for the long flight south to Manstein's headquarters.

Hitler's stay at Manstein's headquarters only lasted a couple of days, and from there he journeyed to his Ukrainian headquarters, 'Wehrwolf,' to oversee operations in southern Russia. For the next four weeks Hitler held daily conferences, which were taken up almost exclusively regarding Manstein's fervent effort to hold positions in the face of an overwhelming enemy drive. Consequently, during the last two weeks of February, there was a tenacious German defense that resulted in only minor Russian gains west of Kursk and none at all in Orel.

Yet, despite German resilience, both Hitler and Manstein were fully aware that the winter battles had left Army Group Don battered, but still in reasonable shape. Several Panzer units had enough strength to launch several counterattacks, and Manstein's counter-offensive was stiffened by an SS Panzer Corps equipped with Tiger tanks. On 20 February, it fought its way from Poltava back toward Kharkov, thus gaining the initiative between the Donets and Dnieper rivers.

A few weeks later, with news that Manstein had finally restored the Army Groups' position in southern Russia, Hitler decided to leave 'Wehrwolf' on 13 March and return to East Prussia. He returned that evening to the 'Wolfschanze' after first stopping at Kluge's Army Group Center headquarters in Smolensk. Hitler learned that the situation in Army Group Centre was relatively stable.

With the southern and central fronts more or less holding the line, Hitler flew back to 'Wolfschanze,' now infused with confidence. Upon his arrival at the headquarters, he received more excellent news that Sepp Dietrich's SS formations had magnificently retaken Kharkov. Hitler, for the first time, became so excited he immediately telephoned Göbbels, asking him to broadcast the good news to the nation, but the Propaganda Minister tactfully decided that it may be best to wait.

Hitler was to spend only a week at his East Prussian headquarters before journeying to Bavaria by his special train, now code-named 'Brandenburg.' During the journey, at intervals, the train stopped, and telephone messages were received. Hitler decided to stretch his legs and took his dog Blondi for a walk outside. Then the train moved off once again. The next morning, it pulled into Rugenwalde in Pomerania for a few hours, whilst Hitler inspected Kruppe's new giant gun, ‘Long Gustav.'

By the afternoon Hitler was in Berlin, and just after midnight on 22 March, ‘Brandenburg’ left the Reich capital bound south for Munich. It was here that the Führer's mistress, Eva Braun, joined the train for the short trip to Berchtesgaden.

At the Berghof Hitler immediately settled into the daily routine. His midday conference rarely finished before late afternoon, and it was normally 4pm before he emerged to have dinner with his guests. The atmosphere at the Berghof was very different from his permanent military headquarters. Here he was able to transform himself into a cheerful host willing to satisfy his guests. Over dinner Hitler often did most of the talking, and then later an adjutant would appear and inform the Führer quietly that everyone had arrived for the evening military conference. Concerned that his guests, particularly the women, would come into contact with the military, he asked them all politely to remain seated. It was often gone midnight before Hitler appeared downstairs, drained by the military conference. He would never utter a word to his guests about the briefings with his commanders, but many could see that he appeared optimistic about the future.

For the first time in many months, he began showing a growing appetite for a large-scale offensive on the Eastern Front, and here at the Berghof, he began deliberating such an operation. The new offensive that Hitler had been planning was a big gamble. But he was still confident that he could repeat earlier devastating victories against the Soviet Army. It was at Kursk that the Führer was confronted with a very tempting strategic opportunity.

Within the huge salient, measuring some 120 miles wide and 75 miles deep, he had been speaking with his generals for some weeks, asking whether they could muster up enough armor and infantry to attack from the north and south of the salient in a huge pincer movement and encircle the Red Army.

In Hitler's view, the offensive would be the greatest armored battle ever won on the Eastern Front and include the bulk of his mighty Panzerwaffe, among them the premier Waffen-SS divisions, the crème of his fighting force.

On 21 April, Zeitler made a special flight to Berchtesgaden to try and convince the Führer not to abandon the offensive, drafted as ‘Order 6.' A few days later, General Model, commander of the 9th Army, arrived at the Berghof. In a two-hour meeting, he presented Hitler with aerial photographs with proof that the Soviets were building strong defensive lines, some of which were impregnable. Hitler decided to cancel the offensive, now coded as 'Citadel,' until 5 May. On 29 April he again postponed the attack until the ninth to allow more time for additional reinforcements to be brought to the front, including the new Panther tank.

When Guderian arrived at the Berghof a few days later, he inquired why the Führer wanted to start another offensive at all in the East in 1943. Hitler replied that he did have doubts himself, and it made him feel very anxious thinking about it, but he could not let a whole year pass by on the defensive. Guderian said that he needed more time to furnish the front with additional armor before ‘Citadel’ could be unleashed and that a postponement of at least six weeks would allow sufficient time. Hitler agreed and on 12 May announced he was flying back briefly to 'Wolfschanze.' He flew to East Prussia to confer with his commanders on the economic implications of the loss of North Africa. Nine days later he returned once more to his mountain retreat. Throughout June, Hitler immersed himself in the final plans for "Citadel."

He had been eventually persuaded by Kluge and Manstein to launch the attack. Yet even as the last tank regiments were moving into place, Hitler clearly doubted the outcome. To keep the attack secret, he instructed OKW not to announce the battle publicly.

Whilst he received reports of the last troops' movements for 'Citadel' on 1 July, after spending almost six weeks at the Berghof, Hitler and his staff were transferred back to East Prussia. That same evening Hitler addressed his ‘Citadel’ commanders, who were gathered at Zeitler's OKH headquarters.

In a clear, confident voice, Hitler explained the importance of the offensive but made it known that the operation had limited objectives. He concluded that he did not want his forces to become immersed, as they had done at Stalingrad, into a long, drawn-out, bitter battle.

During the early morning of 5 July, Operation Citadel was finally launched with one of the greatest concentrations of firepower of the war. For this daring offensive, the German force was distributed between the Northern and Southern groups, consisting of twenty-two divisions, six of which were Panzer and five Panzergrenadier.

Over the coming days, the battle went well. At the evening conference on 8 July, Hitler still appeared optimistic despite reports confirming that his forces had incurred giant losses in both men and weaponry and deprived the troops of even tactical superiority. During the next few days, Hitler was seen to become more agitated by the offensive and increasingly concerned about the loss of large quantities of armor. By 9 July, the Russians had significantly weakened many Wehrmacht units, including those in the SS Panzer Corps, and had completely disrupted their offensive timetable. It was on the blood-soaked plains of Kursk that the Red Army fiercely contested every inch of territory for the first time in the war, achieving parity. Through sheer weight of Soviet strength and stubborn combat along an ever-extending front, the German mobile units were finally being forced to a standstill.

By 12 July, with ever-increasing losses at Kursk, Hitler held an emergency war conference where he decided to abandon the offensive before the entire crème of his Panzerwaffe was destroyed.

In spite of the massive losses sustained at Kursk, Hitler was relieved that he had decided to halt the ‘Citadel’ offensive. Whilst there was a temporary pause on the front, he left the headquarters and boarded his personal FW200 Condor and flew with some of his staff to Berchtesgaden, where he would journey to northern Italy to meet Mussolini. Within a couple of days he had arrived back deeply concerned over the Axis alliance with Italy. By 25 July he was informed that the Duce had resigned. Over the next few weeks that followed, Hitler devoted much of his valuable time to dealing with restoring Mussolini's fascist government, whilst at the same time monitoring events in southern Russia after 'Citadel.'

Following the failure of 'Citadel,' German forces were now on the defensive. In the southern sector of the Eastern Front, troops frantically withdrew as strong Russian forces smashed through defenses and advanced at breakneck speed towards Stalino and Taganrog, along the northern coast of the Sea of Azov. Although German troops distinguished themselves with their bravery, they could only manage to stem the Red Army for short periods of time.

By mid-August, the Russians had wrenched open a giant gap in the German lines west of Kursk, once again threatening to retake the important industrial city of Kharkov.

Throughout the weeks that ominously followed, Hitler and his war staff continued to watch as the German front lines were pulled farther westwards with troops frantically defending, attacking, and counterattacking as the situation demanded. Hitler's elite SS formations fought numerous battles in this sector of the front, but they came at a high cost in blood. As the autumn of 1943 approached, a feeling of despair and gloom gripped the German front lines. To many of the soldiers there was a dull conviction that the war was lost, and yet there was still no sight of its end. Being always outnumbered, perpetually short of fuel and ammunition, and having to constantly exert themselves and their machinery to the very limits of endurance had a profound effect on life at the front. During the latter half of 1943 the equipment situation continued to deteriorate, especially in the Panzer units.

At 'Wolfschanze,' Hitler tried his utmost to replace and resupply the massive losses, but it was becoming increasingly futile. Gradually Hitler became more troubled by the deteriorating situation and began blaming his general staff for the problems. He also blamed his generals for breaking long-distance telephone conversations and leaks of secret information.

Schmundt and NSKK-Gruppenführer Albert Bormann were summoned to the Führerbunker, where Hitler told them that he wanted all security measures increased at the headquarters.