Britain alone – Battle of Britain (WWII History Part 3)

On September 7, 1940, shortly after 17:00 hours, nearly 300 German bombers, escorted by twice as many fighters, launched an attack on London's East End. They bombed Woolwich Arsenal, a power station, a gas plant, the docks, and the city. Two hours later, a further 200 bombers appeared. The bombing continued throughout the night, with the final attack taking place shortly after 04:00 hours. German pilots, returning to their bases in France, described London as an “ocean of flames.”

Winston Churchill said, "The Battle of France is over," on June 18, 1940. “I believe the Battle of Britain is about to commence.” Britain appeared to have virtually little prospect of winning this conflict. If not completely alone, with the help of the Dominions (Australia, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand, but not Ireland) and other portions of the Empire, Britain appeared to be in a hopeless situation. By the summer of 1940, Nazi Germany had conquered Western and Central Europe. Some states that Hitler did not conquer were practically German satellites (Slovakia) or allies (Hungary).

The Battle of Britain, 1940

If the speed and scale of Germany's victory astounded Britain, Hitler was likewise unsure how to use it. He had never wanted a fight with Britain. In early July, Hitler issued an order to prepare for an invasion of Britain. He hoped the invasion, codenamed Operation Sealion, would not be necessary. Hitler offered Britain peace conditions at a speech on July 19.

In exchange for acknowledging Germany's primacy in Europe, Britain would be permitted to keep her empire and navy. He felt he had little to gain from Britain's defeat. In August, Hitler informed his top generals, "Germany is not striving to smash Britain because the beneficiaries will not be Germany but Japan in the East, Russia in India, Italy in the Mediterranean, and America in world trade." Hitler's thoughts had already shifted away from Britain and toward Russia. Even while Sealion was being constructed, German soldiers began to move east.

Churchill's cabinet did not fully rule out the idea of peace. Churchill, however, had no intention of “parleying” with Hitler. Instead, he encouraged the British people to fight on. Many have emphasized the significance of Churchill's oratory in bolstering British resolve. He was more modest. “It was the nation and race living all over the world that had the lion's heart. I was lucky enough to be asked to give the roar.” Churchill did not create the “Dunkirk spirit.” The majority of Britons were determined to prolong the war. Nevertheless, Churchill's “roar” was significant. He confidently cited history to convince his countrymen that the battle could be won.

Churchill was keen to maintain Britain's status as a great power. However, he never addressed the imbalance between British resources and British responsibilities. He did not look far into the future. He seemed to believe, like Hitler, that most issues could be solved via willpower. It is possible to doubt his decision to fight on. If he had made peace in 1940, British power could have remained intact while Stalin and Hitler fought it out in the East, to Britain's advantage.

In many ways, Churchill's choice to prolong the war was insane. Britain alone could not overcome Germany. Churchill's sole hope was that Germany and Russia would fall apart or that the United States would join the war on Britain's side. An alliance with Russia would link Britain to a regime as terrible as Hitler's. The alliance with the United States was unlikely to promote Britain's long-term interests. By prolonging the war, Churchill may have bankrupted Britain and mortgaged its future to the United States. It should be noted that this was likely a better fate than trusting Hitler and becoming a client state of Nazi Germany.

In July, Churchill expressed his intention to fight on. He saw the French fleet, stationed at Mers-el-Kebir, as a potential threat. Although the Franco-German armistice agreement stipulated that the fleet should remain in French hands, there remained a serious risk that Hitler might seize it. On July 3, Churchill ordered its destruction. The British onslaught on July 5 knocked out three big ships.

1,250 French sailors were killed. Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) backed Britain's action. It helped to convince him of Churchill's determination to continue the war. Thus, Britain was worthy of support. The attack, however, strained Britain's relationship with Vichy France. Petain's government severed diplomatic relations with Britain.

Given Churchill's refusal to negotiate peace, Hitler had little choice except to declare war. Nonetheless, he remained ambivalent about Sealion, to the point where he did not directly direct the effort. Instead, following a whistle-stop tour of France, he returned to Germany to reflect on the future. The German high command system was such that when Hitler's attention shifted, there was no one with the motivation or vision to take over. In Britain, however, the German threat was considered seriously. Home Guard units, armed with various improvised weapons, prepared for an invasion.

Army commanders questioned if they could hold out against German forces once they landed. Navy officials questioned whether they could block a landing if the Luftwaffe controlled the airspace. Thus, as the Chiefs of Staff stated, “everything depends on the air force.”

German mentality was largely the same. The Wehrmacht was sure that it could take Britain if it could land its men. The German fleet, decimated during the Norwegian campaign, was unable to protect an invading force. Only the Luftwaffe could prevent the Royal Navy from destroying the German landing forces. In late July, Hitler ordered a massive air offensive against Britain, to be followed by a cross-Channel assault in September, “if we receive the sense that the English are shattered.”

Barges and coastal steamers were built in Belgium and Northern France. The Germans were working on a tight schedule. British aerial resistance would have to be defeated swiftly, giving the Luftwaffe time to bomb the Royal Navy out of the Channel. By October, severe weather would render an invasion unfeasible. Thus, everything hinged on the fight between the Luftwaffe and the RAF. The Battle of Britain refers to the war that took place in the skies over southern England in late summer and early autumn 1940.

Hermann Göring was certain of success, and for good cause. In July, the Luftwaffe had approximately 2,600 planes and 10,000 trained pilots, whereas the RAF had 1,000 planes and 1,500 qualified pilots. Nonetheless, the Luftwaffe encountered major obstacles. Given that it was using captured enemy airfields in Belgium and northern France, every local infrastructure - supply, repair, and communications - had to be tailored to German requirements. Neither did Luftwaffe leaders have a clear strategy.

Was the goal to attack British industry, population centers, radar stations, airfields, or the Royal Navy, or was it primarily to destroy British fighter aircraft? German jets had to travel hundreds of kilometers before coming into contact with the RAF. German Messerschmidt fighters (Me109 and Me110) lacked the range to cover more than a patch of southern England.

In contrast, the RAF Fighter Command operated from home bases and over home territory. This allowed its planes to stay in the air for extended periods of time. Furthermore, many RAF pilots who had to bail out survived to fight another day. German aircrews perished or were imprisoned.

Perhaps the biggest issue was that Göring and other German officials misjudged the RAF's strength. They estimated Britain could only generate 200 fighters every month. From July to November, British manufacturing produced more than 400 Spitfires and Hurricanes every month. (The Germans only built an average of 200 fighters each month during the same time period.) Fighter Command fought the Battle of Britain on about equal footing. It managed to keep 600 fighters operational every day.

The Luftwaffe was never able to direct more than 800 fighters at them. The RAF's main difficulty was a dearth of experienced pilots, not a shortage of aircraft. Luftwaffe authorities claimed that their planes outperformed both the Spitfire and Hurricane. In terms of speed and firepower, the Hurricane was nearly as good as the Spitfire and technically superior to the Me109 and Me110.

German authorities also overestimated the RAF's coordinated warning system, particularly the 50 radar sites that dotted the British coast from the Orkneys to Land's End. These stations detected incoming planes from a distance of around 120 kilometers (75 miles) and could accurately estimate their number and altitude. (Radar was a British invention, credited to Robert Watson-Watt.) The Royal Observer Corps followed the planes after they reached the coast.

Information was routed to the RAF Fighter Command Headquarters in Bentley Priory, near London, and subsequently distributed to the four Fighter Command Groups. By quickly analyzing the intelligence, RAF aircraft were airborne by the time German planes flew over their airfields.

Fighter Command was led by Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding. During the Battle of France, he did everything he could to keep Fighter Command focused on what he saw as its most important role: defending Britain. Dowding's goal now was to prevent the Luftwaffe from achieving air superiority. To that purpose, he sent fewer than half of his fighters to southern England. His northern squadrons, which were out of range of German bombers, were a reserve that he could deploy into action. He believed that his primary responsibility was to secure his airfields and communications infrastructure.

It was so critical to take down bombers before they dropped their bombs, rather than focusing on their fighter escorts. Dowding's policy was opposed by men like Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory and dashing Squadron Leader Douglas Bader. They believed Dowding should launch all of his planes at the Luftwaffe fighters.

The Battle of Britain had no formal starting or end date, but most historians agree that it lasted from mid-July to mid-September. The first wave of the conflict took place across the Channel, with strikes on British commerce ships and western coastal cities.

The Royal Navy, which had to be defeated if the Wehrmacht was to invade, went unharmed. Fighter Command, however, suffered significant casualties. The air conflict over the Channel demonstrated that German tactics were superior and German pilots were better trained. Nonetheless, the RAF quickly learned.

On August 1, Hitler directed the Luftwaffe to “overpower the English air force with all forces at its command in the shortest feasible period.” The goals were airplanes, airbases, and aircraft factories. Göring scheduled “Eagle Day” for August 7. It began to operate on August 8th, despite being plagued by severe weather. Throughout the week, the Germans maintained that the 'exchange ratio' was in their favor. However, German casualties were so significant that Göring directed the Luftwaffe to focus its efforts on airfields. He also raised the proportion of fighters vs. bombers.

Bad weather postponed the commencement of this effort. It took until August 24 for the RAF to feel its effects. Airfields in the south of England sustained significant damage over the next two weeks. In early September, the RAF was precariously near to defeat. Between August 24 and September 6, Fighter Command lost 290 aircraft. The Luftwaffe lost 380 aircraft, with fighters accounting for only half of them. For two weeks, the RAF lost more aircraft than it could replace. A significant pilot shortage was also developing: 231 pilots were killed or injured, with barely half of those coming from training groups.

At this vital juncture, the Luftwaffe altered tactics, shifting its focus to airfields further inland and hitting London. This was a tremendous mistake. It was mainly in reprisal for a British bombing raid in Berlin. The raid was ineffectual, but it infuriated Göring (who had threatened to eat his hat if a single bomb fell on the German capital). Poor intelligence also contributed to the strategic shift. German officials believed the RAF was down to its last reserves.

They thought that an attack on London would drive British fighters north of the capital to engage in battle. As a result, large formations of German bombers, backed up by fighter phalanxes, began attacking London on September 7. The diversion of strikes provided the RAF with much-needed reprieve. Furthermore, London was a longer-range target for the Luftwaffe than southeastern airfields.

This gave Fighter Command additional time to mobilize its fighters for interception. It also shortened the flight time of the Messerschmitt. For ten days in mid-September, the skies above southern England were crowded with German planes flying toward London and being intercepted by RAF fighters.

On September 15, the Luftwaffe sent its greatest force yet: 200 bombers with a heavy fighter escort. Dowding sent all of his planes into a counterattack. The RAF downed almost 60 German planes (not the 183 claimed at the time). The RAF lost 26 planes but was certainly not defeated. German air supremacy had not been established. On September 17, Hitler announced the postponement of Sealion. Nazi Germany suffered its first loss. The consequences of that defeat would be long delayed. However, Britain's survival, which it guaranteed, aided in the demise of Hitler's Germany.

By merely staying a viable force, the RAF won the Battle of Britain. The triumph was largely attributed to 3,000 RAF pilots. The bulk were British, but Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans, Americans, Czechs, and Poles also used British fighters. “Never,” observed Churchill, “has so much been owing to so few.” From July to September, the “few” shot down 1,300 German planes. The RAF lost 800 aircraft (and 500 pilots). Furthermore, the Royal Air Force lost more fighters than the Luftwaffe. The loss of 600 German bombers contributed to the RAF's favorable balance sheet.

While the Battle of Britain was fought in the air, it was also won on the ground, in aircraft factories. Despite the summer casualties, Britain had more fighters available for action in October than it did in July.

The Luftwaffe's onslaught continued into September, but instead of airfields, its primary targets were now British cities. The goal was to undermine British morale. Between September 1940 and May 1941, the Germans dropped 35,000 tons of bombs, more than half of which hit London. After November, all bombing occurred at night (daylight raids caused significant aircraft losses).

The RAF lacked an adequate defense against night bombers. Even with pilots packed with carrots to aid night vision, British fighters had little chance of intercepting the bombers. The “Blitz” claimed the lives of approximately 45,000 people, significantly fewer than anticipated. British propaganda featured cheerful and defiant residents removing the debris after nights of intense bombing.

The bombing typically resulted in panic and uncertainty. However, the ”spirit of the Blitz” was not solely propaganda. The German bombing did not undermine civilian morale. Indeed, in the face of a common threat, the British people may have grown closer together. Nor did the Blitz create significant economic damage. Even in Coventry, which had one of the most intense raids, most facilities were back in full production within a few days. The Blitz only succeeded in instilling long-lasting rage in most Britons, as well as a desire for vengeance.

Bombing was hardly the only, or even the most serious, threat Britain faced. The country's ability to continue feeding the populace, arming the military, and supplying fuel for its ships, aircraft, and tanks was dependent on the ability to keep British maritime channels open. There were several ways in which the Germans could endanger British commerce. German bombers based in France and Norway quickly took a devastating toll. Mines, whether deployed by aircraft, surface ships, or submarines, posed a continual threat.

German battleships and cruisers were the most magnificent but, given the Royal Navy's size, the least effective danger. The most serious threat came from submarines. In April 1941, over 700,000 tons of shipping were lost, which was significantly more than British shipyards could rebuild. The severity of the crisis in Britain necessitated rationing. By mid-1941, Britain was on the verge of losing what Churchill referred to as the “Battle of the Atlantic” and hence the war.

Britain's Search for Allies

Churchill was sustained by a tremendous confidence that the United States would join the war. This confidence was not particularly well-founded. Clearly, FDR sympathized with the British cause. In late 1939, he convinced Congress to allow the Allies to buy weaponry on a “cash and carry” basis. He recognized, however, that most Americans did not want to go to war with Germany. Given the strong isolationist lobby in Congress, he had to be cautious.

For a few weeks following the collapse of France, US military leaders were hesitant to transfer munitions to Britain, fearing that if Britain surrendered, US supplies would fall into German hands and be used against the United States. When it became evident that Britain intended to battle on, FDR resolved to do all possible to assist. Most Americans agreed with him. They regarded Hitler's success as an impending menace to the United States, and they concluded that Britain's existence was critical to the country's own security.

In August 1940, the United States offered Britain 50 destroyers in exchange for the ability to construct bases in British Caribbean territories. Although the majority of the US ships required extensive repairs, the destroyer agreement was a significant gesture and an indicator of FDR's intentions. That intention was kept secret in the autumn of 1940, just before the presidential election.

Wendell Willkie, his opponent, capitalized on the public's fear that FDR was driving the United States into war. FDR declared his commitment to maintaining peace. “Your boys will not be sent to any foreign battles,” he stated throughout the campaign. Following his re-election victory, FDR's support for Britain became increasingly obvious.

Churchill demanded war material. “Give us the tools,” he said, “and we will finish the work.” Unfortunately, Britain was unable to pay for the tools. By late 1940, she was out of dollars and still reliant on US goods. In March 1941, Congress was persuaded to enact the Lend-Lease Act, which empowered FDR to make vast amounts of US resources available to Britain. Repayment was to be made later. This, FDR remarked, was analogous to a man lending his neighbor a garden hose to put out a fire.

He declared that the United States would become “the great arsenal of democracy.” By the middle of 1941, the United States was barely neutral. US forces had taken over from a British garrison in Iceland, and US warships were escorting convoys to Britain halfway across the Atlantic. However, the majority of Americans continued to oppose involvement in the war. Hitler, who had no desire to battle the US, tolerated US violations of neutrality. As a result, there was no certainty regarding when or if the United States would join the war on Britain's side.

Russia was another major source of hope for Churchill. Despite his anti-Bolshevik view, the prospect of an alliance with Russia appealed to his sense of history. Stalin, however, held Stafford Cripps at arm's length after sending him to Moscow to try to repair Anglo-Russian relations. Britain had nothing to offer Russia as acceptable recompense for its breach with Germany. Cripps wrote gloomily in August 1940 that if the Russians had to pick between the two sides, “there is no question whatever they would choose Germany.”

Nonetheless, German-Soviet relations gave Britain some hope. Stalin, who had intended for a long war of attrition, was alarmed about France's swift defeat. Determined to take advantage of the circumstances, Hitler annexed the Baltic States and parts of Romania in June 1940. These acquisitions infuriated Hitler. He despised communism and hoped to gain Lebensraum in the East. By September, his high command was planning a strike against Russia. A large number of troops were moving eastward. Nonetheless, Hitler left his options open.

In November, he met with Russian Foreign Minister Molotov in Berlin and recommended that Russia, Germany, Italy, and Japan divide the world. Germany would control most of Europe, Italy the Mediterranean, Japan the Far East, and the Soviet Union Persia and India. Molotov expressed no interest. He was more concerned about the situation in Finland, Bulgaria, and Romania, and vowed to keep Germany strictly to the terms of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, which delineated their separate domains of control in eastern and southern Europe.

This was enough to persuade Hitler that “the final struggle with Bolshevism” was unavoidable. The decision to attack Russia was finalized in December 1940. Six months would pass before the forces required to carry it out were mobilized.

Meanwhile, Hitler attempted to enlist additional allies against Britain. In October 1940, he contacted Spanish dictator Francisco Franco, attempting to persuade him to join the Axis and assault Gibraltar. The loss of Gibraltar would have severely reduced Britain's position in the Mediterranean.

Franco, who did not trust Hitler and was under significant economic pressure from the United States not to move closer to the Axis powers, was not persuaded. Petain, whom Hitler met the next day, was likewise unresponsive. Japan did not participate in the war against Britain. However, the Japanese government signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940. This required the signatories to help each other if they were assaulted.

Italy at War, 1940 to 1941

Mussolini was Hitler's main ally in 1940-41. He wanted to mimic Hitler's triumph. France's fall and Britain's weakness created enormous prospects, not least the possibility of transforming the Mediterranean into an Italian “lake.” However, Mussolini's ambitions outweighed his power. Italian forces were not prepared for battle.

The army had expanded well beyond its means. The navy had good ships but lacked the necessary leadership and industrial support to operate them successfully. The air force possessed only antiquated aircraft. Italian troops performed poorly against France. Nonetheless, Mussolini felt certain of his success in Africa and the Balkans. After France surrendered, Italy's fleet of six battleships became the Mediterranean's biggest capital force.

The Royal Navy had just five capital ships. Undeterred, British Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham promised a combat at Calabria in July 1940. The Italian fleet possessed all the advantages. It was aware of British movement via radio decrypts; it had more and better ships; and the combat took place near to Italy, assuring that the Italian ships got air assistance. Despite this, the Italian navy retreated upon engagement, losing one battleship in the process. On November 11, Royal Navy carrier-borne planes caused significant damage to Italian battleships anchored at Taranto. Now Britain had the naval advantage in the Mediterranean.

In the summer of 1940, Italian troops from Ethiopia marched into border areas in Sudan and Kenya, occupying British Somaliland. Italy had approximately 92,000 troops in Ethiopia, as well as 250,000 native troops supported by 323 aircraft. Britain sent out only 40,000 troops, most of whom were locals, as well as 100 aircraft. Furthermore, British forces were outmatched in equipment.

However, Italy's Ethiopian army was timidly led and could not be quickly reinforced or replenished. In contrast, the British could strengthen their position in the region by transferring troops from Egypt, India, and South Africa. In January 1941, the British Commander in East Africa, General Alan Cunningham (Admiral Cunningham's brother), launched an offensive.

He quickly evicted the Italians from their footholds on British territory before declaring support for Haile Selassie (the former Emperor of Ethiopia) and extending the war into Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. Cunningham's main army, approaching from Kenya, struggled to keep up with the retreating enemy. Cunningham gained control of Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa, in April. Other Allied troops occupied Eritrea. The Italian Empire in East Africa had disintegrated.

Egypt was seen as significantly more important than Ethiopia by both Britain and Italy. Churchill worried that the invasion of Egypt and the loss of the Suez Canal would result in the downfall of British power in the Middle East. As a result, when Britain faced an invasion danger, he dispatched troops and a third of its tank strength to Egypt (where Britain had military rights).

Nonetheless, the 70,000 British troops in Egypt were vastly outnumbered by the 200,000 Italian troops in Libya. Mussolini ordered an invasion into Egypt in mid-September 1940, citing Italy's numerical superiority as well as improved supply and reinforcement capabilities. The Italian forces did not push too far. After three days, they began erecting defenses and remained motionless for the following three months.

In December, 35,000 British, Australian, and Indian forces launched a counterattack with just 275 tanks. The strike was intended more as a raid than a major assault. Amazingly, the Italian army collapsed. The British offensive lasted until February 1941. The Italians were pushed back over 2,735 kilometers (1,700 miles). One hundred and thirty thousand Italian prisoners were taken, along with a large number of weapons, vehicles, and tanks. The Allied forces, led by General Wavell, lost fewer than 500 men.

Hitler had wanted to delegate responsibility for the Mediterranean to Mussolini, who was preoccupied with Russia. However, he felt compelled to intervene. In February 1941, he dispatched Erwin Rommel and the Afrika Korps to rescue the Italians. Rommel, who sought glory and was daring, was most likely the war's outstanding battlefield leader. Instead of defending, as the German high command intended, he went on the offensive.

With the exception of Tobruk, the British had lost all of their victories in Libya by mid-April. Rommel, whose supply lines were perilously stretched, was unable to do more. Wavell, prompted by Churchill, mounted a premature offensive in May-June. This resulted in a costly failure. Rommel's well-placed anti-tank weapons destroyed approximately 100 British tanks. In July, Wavell was succeeded by Claude Auchinleck.

The Balkans and the East Mediterranean, 1940 to 1941

In October 1940, Mussolini, eager to expand and settle ancient scores, authorized an Italian invasion of Greece from Albania. He told his son-in-law, Ciano, that Hitler always confronted him with a fait accompli (something that has been done and cannot be changed). This time, I am going to pay him back in his own coin. He will learn that I have invaded Greece.

Mussolini's war on Greece coincided with the demobilization of a large number of Italian troops. Greek troops, who were significantly more committed to the battle than the Italians, defended their mountain strongholds, inflicting heavy fatalities on the latter. In November, the Greeks counterattacked, turning the Italian withdrawal into a rout. The Greek army threatened to conquer major portions of Albania. Britain used Italy's invasion of Greece as an excuse to occupy Crete and base some RAF forces in southern Greece.

The Balkans was a delicate region for Germany. Hitler wanted to diminish Soviet dominance in the region. In June 1940, Romania was compelled to give up territory to Russia. It appeared that Romania might also lose Transylvania to Hungary. In August 1940, with Hungary and Romania on the verge of war, Germany interfered, not least because Romania's oilfields were Germany's primary source of supply.

Germany convinced Hungary and Romania to accept a deal. The compromise suited neither country. Romania lost land, while Hungary was dissatisfied with the gains. In Romania, King Carol abdicated, and General Antonescu became ruler. The country was on the point of disintegration, which presented Russia with appealing prospects. At Romania's request, Hitler dispatched a military “mission” reportedly to boost German-Romanian relations by bringing Romanian troops up to German standards. In truth, the unit was stationed to protect the oil sectors and keep Russia out. Romania joined the Tripartite Pact in November, as did Hungary.

The Italian catastrophes in Greece dealt damage to the Axis reputation. Furthermore, the British presence in Greece put Romania's oilfields at risk of being bombed. This might severely limit Germany's ability to wage war. Hitler felt compelled to save his ally. While he did not want to be distracted from the war on Russia, he could not leave his southern flank vulnerable.

The Greeks tried to urge Hitler to keep the peace, convincing him that their only disagreement was with the Italians. Their pleas were unheard. Thus, in February 1941, the Greek government requested that British troops be dispatched to Greece. There was a heated debate inside the British cabinet about whether to send these forces, which would have to be removed from North Africa.

Churchill was not enthused; he preferred to finish off the Italians in Libya. However, the majority of the cabinet supported assisting Greece. If Britain failed to fulfill its commitment to help, potential friends would suffer. In addition, deploying troops to Greece may persuade Turkey and Yugoslavia to join Britain. British forces started arriving on the Greek mainland in March.

Hitler was also active. Bulgaria was pressured to sign the Tripartite Pact (which it signed on March 1) and allow German soldiers to be deployed. Fourteen German divisions arrived in Bulgaria and were stationed near Greece's border. German military planners recognized Yugoslavia's importance in quickly defeating Greek and British soldiers. German pressure on Yugoslavia to join the Tripartite Pact was relentless. On March 25, the Yugoslav government gave in and joined. By late March, Germany had established a strong position in the Balkans.

Despite this, during the night of March 26 to 27, a group of Serb officers condemned the Yugoslav–German treaty, seized Belgrade, forced the (pro-British!) regent Prince Paul to quit, and crowned King Peter as ruler. A government was formed under the leadership of General Simovic. The coup was nothing short of crazy. It separated a precariously unified country, pitting Serbs against Croats. It was also likely to provoke the Germans, whose armies surrounded Yugoslavia.

The new Serb government could not rely on outside aid. Instead, it was surrounded by hostile powers, including Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, all of which had long-standing territorial conflicts with Yugoslavia. Hitler, thinking that Britain was behind the coup, warned his high command that he wanted to “smash Yugoslavia.” Hitler invaded Yugoslavia on April 6, declaring the new government illegal. The inadequately equipped Yugoslav army was not completely mobilized.

The majority of the Yugoslav air force (450 mostly antiquated planes) was destroyed in an initial air attack. The Luftwaffe went on to bomb Belgrade, killing around 17,000 civilians. On April 8, German, Italian, and Hungarian troops broke past Yugoslav defenses. The invasion allowed Croat and Slovene nationalists to declare independence from Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia.

Several Croatian units mutinied and joined the enemy. The Yugoslav army's defense was so poor that the Germans lost only 151 fatalities during the operation. Belgrade fell on April 12th. Five days later, Yugoslavia surrendered. The country was completely destroyed in ten days.

Greece, which the Germans invaded on April 6, did not last long. Greek morale was strong following their victory over the Italians, and they had the backing of three British divisions. However, Greek soldiers were in a suicidal situation. German soldiers broke through the Monastir gap between the Greek armies in Albania and Salonika and advanced southward. The Greek-British front crumbled as one position after another was outflanked. Greek Prime Minister Koryzis committed suicide.

British forces were pursued by the Luftwaffe and withdrew south to locate safe harbors. Some British troops were still arriving, while others were being evacuated. Despite almost overwhelming Axis air supremacy, the Royal Navy was able to evacuate over 50,000 of the 62,000 British troops stationed in Greece, but valuable equipment was lost.

On April 27, German forces invaded Athens. The Wehrmacht's superiority over its Balkan opponents, along with the ineptness of Greek and Yugoslav defensive systems, accounts for the German victory. After incurring barely 5,000 casualties, the Germans had seized the majority of Greece. Italy seized much of the former Yugoslavia.

Hitler's military advisers recommended an aerial strike on Malta. Capture of Malta would block Britain's sea route to the Suez Canal. General Student, Commander of the XI Air Corps, believed Malta was overly well-defended and advocated an airborne assault on Crete. Hitler agreed. 500 transport planes and 100 gliders were made available to transport 22,000 men.

Although Student expected to be outnumbered, he was confident that surprise, the exceptional quality of his men, and German air dominance would guarantee victory. His force was clearly superior in caliber to the 30,000 Allied troops in Crete. Many of the troops, fleeing from the Greek disaster, were confused and discouraged. They also lacked tanks, artillery, and aerial support.

Nonetheless, it appeared impossible that the Germans could conquer Crete. First, they lacked command of the water. Second, Ultra, the intelligence source obtained from the interception and deciphering of enemy ciphers, informed General Freyberg, the British Commander in Crete, about the German attack's targets and timing. Unfortunately, he made insufficient preparations, deploying many of his soldiers for a seaborne onslaught that never materialized. Nonetheless, German parachute losses on May 20th were horrific. Hundreds of men died in the air as they descended.

The next day, however, German troops took control of Maleme's runway, allowing them to fly in reinforcements. German troops rapidly took advantage of the situation, with the help of the Luftwaffe. It was the same old story. British troops quickly retreated.

Crete was a catastrophe for Britain. Two thousand troops were killed, and a further 12,000 were taken prisoner. The Royal Navy was assaulted by German planes while evacuating approximately 18,000 personnel, losing three cruisers and six destroyers; two battleships, one carrier, six cruisers, and seven destroyers were damaged. Crete was the most expensive British naval action of the war. Furthermore, the fall of Crete was a major strategic setback. Possession of the island would have given Britain a platform from which to threaten Romania's oilfields. However, Crete was an uncertain German triumph.

The Germans lost 4,000 elite troops and perhaps 300 aircraft. Disappointed by the battle, the first major parachute operation in history, Hitler concluded that parachuting in combat was a death sentence with the odds stacked against the parachutist (Allied commanders reached other conclusions). He thus abandoned the plan of an airborne attack on Malta.

Britain had greater success in the Middle East. The 38,000 Vichy French forces in Syria, commanded by General Dentz, were an embarrassment. Dentz may threaten Egypt from the east. He might also back Britain's Arab adversaries in Iraq. In April 1941, British intelligence indicated that Germany and Italy intended to utilize Syria as a staging ground to supply Rashid Ali, Iraq's pro-British regent who had been deposed.

In May, German aircraft (with Iraqi markings) flew into Syria and bombed British forces in Iraq. Nonetheless, British forces quickly defeated Rashid Ali and restored the Iraqi regency. Dentz's involvement in the Iraq event prompted British and Free French soldiers to enter Syria in June. Dentz quickly surrendered. A Free French regime was established in Syria, strengthening Britain's control over Egypt and Iraq.

Conclusion of the Battle of Britain

By 1941, it was obvious that Britain had survived. However, she was still not completely protected. As Germany increased her U-boat fleet, it appeared that Britain would be starved into submission. Britain was unable to place Germany under similar pressure. The only way Britain could attack Germany was by bombing.

Unfortunately, British bombing raids lacked pattern, purpose, and success. Casualties among bomber crews were comparable to German civilian casualties. In reality, Germany was more powerful in June 1941 than in June 1940. Her soldiers were superior on land. Whenever British and German ground forces engaged, the Germans won.

German victories in Libya, Greece, and Crete dealt major blows to British morale. Fortunately for Britain, Churchill's choice to continue the war was about to be justified. In 1941, Britain was to gain the big allies she required.

Important Dates

June 1940

Churchill determined to fight on: Britain alone

July-September 1940

Battle of Britain: RAF vs. Luftwaffe: British victory

September 1940 to May 1941

The Blitz: British cities bombed

1939 onwards

Battle of the Atlantic: U-boat threat

1940 to 1941

British success against Italy in North Africa: Greek success against Italy

November 1940

• Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) re-elected President
• Romania joined the Tripartite Pact

March 1941

Lend-Lease Act: US economic aid to Britain

April 1941

German forces overran Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete

1941

German General Rommel defeated British forces in North Africa