Adolf Hitlers Führersonderzug and Reich Chancellery (1939-1940)

By the summer of 1939 all military preparations for the planned attack against Poland, code-named ‘Case White’ (Fall Weiss), had been issued to the armed forces. As the second half of August 1939 began, German military chiefs pushed forward their final plans to destroy Poland and liberate its western parts from an area that was predominantly German.

On 22 August, Adolf Hitler summoned his principal Eastern Front commanders to his mountain retreat at the Berghof on the Obersalzberg and elaborated on his military plans. Speaking with eagerness, he told his generals that the war with Poland would be a different type of warfare, not like the dehumanizing years of trench warfare in the 1914-18 war, but a new concept: Blitzkrieg, a swift, all-out attack of such force and ferocity that victory would be secured quickly and decisively.

As a storm began to brew outside, he told his captivated audience that they should display an iron nerve; even if the West wanted war, ‘it was vital,' he said, ‘to crush every living spark out of Poland rapidly and, if needed, brutally.' In one of his most arrogant and uncompromising moods, he concluded, ‘I have done my duty; now go out and do yours. 'Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Walther von Brauchitsch, assured his Führer that the Wehrmacht would do its duty. He then leaped to his feet and dismissed the whole audience, telling them, 'Gentlemen, to your stations.'

A few days later, the planned attack against Poland for 26 August was temporarily postponed. Although the postponement greatly increased the mental strain and physical pressure on the men waiting in the fields, undergrowth, and forests, Hitler and his commanders were confident that when the attack did come, it would be swift and victorious.

At 4.25am on 1 September, six days later, Hitler finally unleashed Directive No. 1 for the planned invasion of Poland. Over the next few days, Hitler and his commanders monitored the developments of the invasion from the Reich Chancellery in Berlin. In front of his commanders Hitler was in awe of the rapid progress of his forces.

The campaign, it seemed, had undoubtedly taken on a character that would persist for the few weeks that followed. Everywhere north, south, and east, the Polish front lines were shrinking, cracking slowly but surely under the massive German pressure.

During the late morning of 3 September, after receiving the formal British ultimatum to withdraw German troops from Poland, Hitler told his army adjutant to telephone General Erwin Rommel's protection battalion to expect the Führer to transfer to his HQ later that day.

A little after eight o'clock in the evening on 3 September 1939, under the cover of darkness, Hitler's motorcade arrived at the Anhalt railway station in Berlin. Hitler's Führersonderzug, or Führer's special train, which had been moved from the Tempelhof depot, waited on the cordoned-off platform preparing for its departure.

At nine o'clock, the station's colored signal lamps signaled the all clear, and the long train, under the command of the stationmaster's whistle, departed from the platform, heading towards the battlefield of Poland. On board the train there were nine or more personal adjutants, three or more press officials, several radio operators, a number of guests including the chief photographer, Heinrich Himmler's liaison officer, a representative of the Foreign Office, three valets, the chief driver and a deputy, ten SS-Begleit-Kommando men and ten Reich Railway catering service employees including waiters, cooks, kitchen maids, and two silver cleaners, five railway-police officers, and three inspectors of the Reich Mail. Two motor convoys were directed wherever the Führersonderzug travelled and were available immediately when ordered. A squad of aeroplanes, commanded by Captain Baur, also followed the Führer's train.

The train comprised twelve or more coaches and was drawn by one engine (by 1940, there were two engines pulling the coaches in tandem). There were among the coaches two 2 cm anti-aircraft wagons, two baggage cars, the Führer's Pullman, and one press car with a communication center, including a 700-watt short-wave transmitter. There was Hitler's extensive guest, dining, and personal staff accommodation, including a bathing car. In Hitler's personal coach was a drawing room with an oblong table and eight chairs grouped around it. His adjutants and man servants occupied the four remaining compartments of his coach. This part of the train also housed secretaries, cooks, aides, and signal corps men.

Attached to these quarters was his communication center, equipped with a radiotelephone and several teletype machines. This coach was divided into two. The other part was taken up as a conference room comprising a chair, map, and table where Hitler could daily survey the war front. The dining car and sleeping cars could be connected with the postal telephone network during stops. Among the other cars was the escort car for the Reich Security Service, or Reichssicheerheitsdienst (RSD), and the Führer Escort Battalion, or Führer-Begleit-Battaillon (FBB). The remaining coaches consisted of two cars for personnel such as secretaries, cooks, aides, and signal corps men, and two sleeping cars for entourage and guests.

During the early hours of Monday morning on 4 September 1939, the Führersonderzug pulled into a dusty Pomeranian railway siding in Bad Polzin, some 150 miles north of Berlin. Almost immediately a fully mechanized unit comprising an armored, rifle reconnaissance, and tank company under the command of General Erwin Rommel cordoned off the area around the train and manned their guns. For the rest of the night, the train idled until it was time to move on to its final destination. By dawn the train had moved again and pulled into Gross-Born station, the final stage of its journey.

For the next two weeks, Hitler was to spend most of his waking hours in the stuffy, claustrophobic atmosphere of his command coach. In the train, as at the Reich Chancellery, the brown Nazi party uniform dominated the scene. On board there were nine or more adjutants and aides, Keitel and Jodl of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) (later, each had his own Sonderzug), the Führer's army adjutant Gerhard Engel, two personal physicians for the Führer, two secretaries, and three or more press officers, including the Reich press chief Otto Dietrich, who was soon to write a short book about the journey.

There were several radio operators, guests such as the chief photographer Heinrich Hoffmann, a liaison officer of Heinrich Himmler, Karl Wolff, Martin Bormann's younger brother Albert, a representative of the Foreign Office, three valets, the driver and deputy, ten FBB, ten RSD men, fourteen officials and employees of the Reich Railway Catering Service, including waiters, cooks, kitchen maids, and two silver cleaners, five railway police officers, and three inspectors of the Reich mail. Later, Theodor Eicke also operated his command headquarters of the brutal Totenkopf regiments from Hitler's special train. It was here onboard the train that Keitel introduced to the Führer his Chief of Operations, Alfred Jodl. This tall, balding officer impressed Hitler immediately. Jodl was to be his principle strategic advisor until the end of the war.

From the headquarters train Hitler was able to devote his attention entirely to operations in Poland. The train made several movements so that he could more readily visit parts of the front he was interested in. Each day he would appear in the command coach to hear Jodl's personal reports on the morning situation. Four days into the invasion of Poland, codenamed "Operation White," the German Army achieved stunning successes on all fronts.

On and off the train, Hitler took enormous interest in the war against Poland, and during every stop the train made, he was able to spend his days, regardless of the risk, touring from the train as a base, moving in two small motor convoys of heavy six-wheeled armor-plated Mercedes vehicles with armored escort.

On 5 September, the train travelled northwest to Gross Born Troop Training Area southwest of Neustettin; on 8 September, it moved further south to Oppeln in Silesia. On 13 September it had moved once more and shifted to Gogolin, south of Oppeln. Finally, on 18 September, it changed north again to Goddentow-Lanz, near Lauenburg in Pomerania.

Throughout these tours Hitler's staff continued to busy themselves on board the train with accumulating various reports on the progress of the three armed services. Once these reports had been collected, the daily ‘Wehrmacht Communique’ was prepared in draft and then sent to the OKW chief of operations, General Jodl, who, via Keitel, obtained Hitler's approval and signature. Both the Führersonderzug and the Reich Chancellery were in constant contact, continuously exchanging data and other important information, ensuring that the nerve centers were updated and informed, both militarily and politically.

On 19 September, the headquarters transferred, for the first time during the Polish campaign, from the train to the seafront Kasino Hotel on Nordstrasse in Zoppot, just west of Danzig. There, Hitler occupied rooms 251, 252, and 253 in the hotel. Using the hotel as his base, he continued daily to visit areas of the military operations either by motor convoy or air. Late in the afternoon of 25 September, Hitler returned to his train. The next morning it departed, arriving back in Berlin at 5.05pm on 26 September 1939.

Within the hour, Hitler was back in the Reich Chancellery, and the Sonderzug was parked up at the Tempelhof repair depot. On 27 September Hitler finally received news that Warsaw had capitulated. The Führer presented new colors to the entire headquarters battalion during a parade the following day. Afterwards, emboldened by the victory over Poland, he assembled in the Chancellery his army and army group commanders and spoke at length about attacking the West. He expressed that Germany must strike as soon as possible, before it is too late. The attack, he said, if conditions were at all possible, should commence during the autumn of 1939. Several generals present at the meeting had already known about Hitler's intentions of attacking the West during the Polish campaign.

Whilst on board the Führersonderzug on 14 September, Hitler discussed the real possibility of attacking the West with his chief engineer, Fritz Todt. He spoke of the need for a proper permanent headquarters site in the West in which to direct a military campaign. Jodl had instructed his deputy, General Warlimont, to investigate ideas for a field headquarters for OKW in west-central Germany from which the later phases of the war could be conducted. The headquarters were to be situated out of range of long-range artillery but as near as possible to the Western Front. There was also to be accommodation for the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe in the area.

In the weeks that followed, the search began for the first permanent field headquarters. General Rommel and some members of his staff looked at railway stations in the west. Hitler's adjutants General Schmundt; Captain Engel; Captain von Below; Captain von Puttkameer; Dr. Todt; and Albert Speer all scoured the local terrain, inspecting possible sites. One suitable location was found by a staff officer of Section L. It was cited in the eastern foothills of the Tauns in the area of Giessen-Nauheim, but Hitler subsequently turned down the location.

However, the old family estate of Ziegenberg, which included a country house and extensive farmland and buildings, was finally accepted as the most suitable plot to begin work. The farmer was more than eager to sell the land, and alterations for the first Führerhauptquartier began almost immediately. Both Speer and Todt were given instructions to modernize the Ziegenberg mansion, and the project included the construction of some bunkers around the building that were partially below ground level with fortified entrances against possible aerial attack.

There were also bunker houses and fortified structures erected that looked like alpine chalets with bunkers below ground. Single-story, prefabricated barracks-type housing and wooden barracks clad with thick concrete walls and 4 cm-thick bolted windows for splinter protection were also built.

Water and electricity were installed along with drains and sewers. Miles of cable pits were dug for the telecommunications, and flak emplacements, trenches, and guard houses were sited throughout the installation.

The site was called 'A' for Adlerhorst (Eagle's Nest). By late 1939, work had progressed at remarkable speed, with the conversion work at Ziegenberg costing the budget some 3.9 million Reichsmarks. However, the site was still behind schedule and needed more time to prepare for direct military operations against the West. Another worrying problem was the fact that the telephone exchange would not be ready for months. But despite these problems, after weeks of extensive work on the area, Hitler suddenly announced that he found the new headquarters far too luxurious. In wartime, he remarked, he should live in simple style.

As the Führer, he wanted to have the most modest personal requirements. He declared that those making pilgrimages to his former Western Front headquarters after the war would never understand it if he had directed a war in luxury. The headquarters finally settled there for the Ardennes offensive at the end of 1944, after over five years of war. Hitler occupied the bunkers near Wiesental, known as 'Amt 500,' while his Commander-in-Chief, 'west' von Rundstedt, resided in the Ziegenberg mansion.

In November 1939, another more northern location was found near the little hamlet of Rodert, east of Munstereifel and south-west of Cologne. At about the same time, another location in southern Germany was chosen in the Black Forest. Situated near Glans-Munchenweiler, the site was nominated, inspected, and approved, and work commenced rapidly on the installation.

Whilst the construction and planning of a permanent headquarters in the west continued, Hitler's headquarters temporarily resided at the Reich Chancellery. Hitler had equipped the big congress room in his official Berlin residence as a war conference room. In its center was a large map table. The OKW—Generals Keitel and Jodl moved into the neighboring rooms vacated by the Führer's adjutants.

During the first weeks after the conquering of Poland, Hitler was seen by his war staff anxiously deliberating between continuing the fight against the West and making peace. On 19 October, Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) reluctantly issued its first hasty directive on "Operation Yellow" (the attack on France and the Low Countries). Hitler once again expressed his view that a long-drawn-out war of attrition with both Britain and France would be a drain on Germany's limited resources and expose the Reich to attack from behind by Russia.

Whilst Hitler appeared optimistic in front of his staff, among his generals there was an underlying atmosphere of fear and doubt. They did not share Hitler's views and could see no favorable prospect in an offensive. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch did not think that the German forces were strong enough to conquer France and argued that if they invaded France, they would draw Britain's full weight into the war.

Other commanders in OKH were also opposed to the plans of invading the West and personally went to see Brauchitsch to demonstrate such an attempt. None of them shared Hitler's belief in the new power of the Panzer divisions, and as a result acute differences of opinion began to divide both OKW and OKH.

On 21 November a disgruntled Hitler issued orders to his leading generals and admirals for a special conference at the Chancellery. Two days later at noon a large audience packed the enormous hall to hear Hitler speak about the opposition to his unorthodox military strategy. For nearly two hours the Führer contemptuously reminded his generals that they were to do their duty like every other soldier, and he was determined to stamp out the least vestige of defeatism within its ranks.

Whilst he decided to postpone the attack temporarily in the West, the opposition caused resentment between Hitler and his senior army generals. Consequently, OKW began overriding Brauchitsch's objections and dealing directly with individual OKH generals instead. Keitel dealt with Halder and Jodl with the army's chief of operations section, Colonel von Greiffenberg. It was Greiffenberg or his senior staff officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Heusinger, who were normally summoned to the Chancellery by Jodl when new ideas from Hitler had to be passed on to OKH.

The Commander-in-Chief and chief of staff of the Army now only appeared at the Chancellery when summoned by the Führer. Even by the beginning of December there was still no army representative present. Only occasionally did they have to make presentations on matters concerning their services.

OKW continued throughout the winter of 1939-40 to scheme against the heads of the OKH and call upon specific generals, even without the Commander-in-Chief's prior knowledge. For instance, in a private meeting with the commander of the 16th Army, General Busch, Hitler discussed at length his initial plans for an attack through the Ardennes without ever consulting the Commander-in-Chief.

Similarly, Keitel called upon the Panzer ace General Guderian for detailed advice on the same subject. All these factors further weakened the Army's position in the Führerhauptquartier and prevented it from having a decisive voice in the conduct of any future military operations. Hitler was resolute in his determination to ensure that his military plans would never again face opposition.

In December, whilst the War Department busied itself with plans to attack the West, Hitler left Berlin for a brief respite at his alpine mountain retreat, the Berghof. On his journey south on board the Führersonderzug, he spent three days touring the western front, joining in the Christmas celebrations of SS regiments, infantry, and Luftwaffe units.

A few days later, he returned to Berlin and again postponed ‘Operation Yellow,' this time until mid-January. He made it clear to both Keitel and Jodl that if the weather did not clear, he would finally agree to call off the offensive until the spring or early summer.

Days later, he was once again journeying south back to the Berghof for Christmas. From this solitary mountain valley known as the Obersalzberg, a lot had changed since work began in 1935. Visitors now had to pass into an area guarded by a high barbed-wire fence, which was almost two miles long and could only be entered following identity checks at two gates.

With still no definite Führerhauptquartier apart from that of the Reich Chancellery, Hitler had been compelled to expand the Obersalzburg. He knew that when he moved from one of his field headquarters to this Bavarian mountain, his whole headquarters would have to move with him, including aides, office personnel, signal corps troops, FBB troops, and his personal SS bodyguard detachment, the Leibstandarte-SS ‘Adolf Hitler.'

A huge program was initiated to provide quarters and office space for everyone, leading to the establishment of the headquarters. Part of the alpine infantry barracks at Strub near Berchtesgaden was used, and a new camp was drawn up to be built near Winkl, on the Bad Reichenhall-Berchtesgaden road.

In spite of the huge construction program on the Obersalzburg, Hitler enjoyed Christmas at his snow-covered mountain retreat. On 10 January he was back in the Chancellery and immediately chaired a conference with his senior commanders on preparations for ‘Operation Yellow.' Even though weather reports confirmed that everything looked good for an attack, on 13 January bad weather forced Hitler to cancel all movements to the front.

Then as the weather increasingly worsened, he finally directed that the whole offensive be called off until the spring. He made it obvious to OKH that a constant state of alert was to be maintained on the assumption that "Yellow" might begin at any time.

At the end of January, with plans of an attack against the West looking more imminent than before, Hitler eagerly sent his chief military adjutant on an extended tour of the Western Front. Upon his return to the Chancellery on 1 February, Colonel Schmundt excitedly reported that the great General Erich von Manstein and the Panzer ace General Heinz Guderian had spoken to him about the attack against the West and believed that a decisive victory was possible provided that new methods were applied.

The news undoubtedly convinced Hitler of his own military genius and logical planning ability. The subsequent outstanding success of his strategy now made him more reluctant to pay heed to any military advisors. On 17 January he buttonholed Manstein in person when the general attended a luncheon for the new corps commanders. During dinner, Hitler reiterated his grand strategy against the West and discussed in detail how to protect the German war economy in Norway from British threats.

The strategic need to occupy the Norwegian coast before the British now began to place enormous stress on the war staff at the Chancellery. Hitler had organized and briefed a special staff to study a military operation in Norway. Supreme headquarters selected General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst to direct the operation, and they studied the preparations for the operation known as "Exercise Weser" at length.

Once again Hitler gave unprecedented disregard to OKH and did not consult the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at all on the operation. When a staff officer inquired why Halder had not been briefed on the plans, Hitler said that he did not wish to overload the high levels of OKH with the Norwegian operations in view of the simultaneous preparations for the campaign in the west.

On 1 March, General Falkenhorst submitted his proposals to Hitler at the Reich Chancellery for the invasion of Norway, which now embraced Denmark as well. Two weeks later, on 17 March, Hitler and his staff left the Chancellery and boarded the Führersonderzug, now code-named 'Amerika.' Hitler had named his train after a small hamlet near Gheluvet, southeast of Ypres, close to America, where he had first fought in the trenches during the First World War. On board 'Amerika,' Hitler and his staff journeyed south to the Brenner Pass, where he met the Italian dictator Mussolini to discuss why Italy should enter the war as Germany's ally.

Two days later Hitler was steaming back to Berlin. On 22 March he again headed south, flying to the Berghof for the Easter weekend. On Easter Monday he returned to the Reich Chancellery so that he could discuss the imminent military operations with his war staff. At the midday war conference he told his military staff and naval experts, including Admiral Raeder, that Germany should seize the initiative and occupy Norway by 17 April.

On 1 April, Hitler personally addressed the handpicked commanders who were to carry out the operation. Six days later, the German naval fleet was put to sea, destined for six Norwegian cities. The naval staff, now familiar faces at the Chancellery, assured their Führer they were confident that their task force would yield him victory. By 9 April General Falkenhorst sent a message to the Chancellery with the word that both Norway and Denmark had been occupied, as instructed. Yet by the following day reports confirmed that the British Navy was far from defeated and had entered Narvik waters and sunk several German cargo ships and destroyers.

The news threw the entire German war staff into complete disarray. The crisis was so bad that Hitler spoke openly to Brauchitsch about abandoning Narvik altogether. For the next week, the Führer became increasingly agitated by the events unfolding in Norway and began to argue with Keitel and Jodl. Even on his fifty-first birthday, Hitler found it impossible to relax, as he was preoccupied with the idea of freeing the British from Narvik. However, on the last day of April, the long-awaited word finally reached the Chancellery: victory had been secured.

At lunch Hitler was in a euphoric mood over the news and thanked Jodl for his contributions to the victory. Whilst the military crises had thrown OKW into complete disarray, much of the confusion had been attributed to the lack of organization of the headquarters, which consisted of many scattered parts. It was acknowledged that Hitler, when the time came to moving to his field headquarters, should employ a new solid organization to direct and exercise an even more efficient system under OKW's operations staff, including an adequate signals network.

Work on Hitler's new Western Front headquarters was already well under way. The location for the supreme field headquarters was secret, and only certain members of staff from Section L and Hitler's aides were intimately involved in its whereabouts. With the three locations already approved, it was the one near the little hamlet of Rodert, east of Munstereifel that was chosen by Hitler. The new site was initially known as ‘Installation R,' later as ‘Installation F,' and finally as ‘Felsennest’ (Rocky Nest), where Hitler was to direct his campaign against the West.

He had already instructed that OKH should be located in the same area, and he personally selected a neighboring hunting lodge as the headquarters for the Army Commander-in-Chief and chief of staff, with a skeleton working staff. The Luftwaffe chiefs of staff chose their headquarters.

Jodl had been given strict instructions to the Todt Organization, which was tasked with constructing the headquarters and for the armies neighboring 'Forsterei' to complete it as quickly as possible. Now that ‘Yellow’ was secretly poised to begin in the first weeks of May, it was imperative that everything be completed for Hitler at his new headquarters. While the final adjustments were being made to 'Felsennest' at the Reich Chancellery, Hitler gathered his staff for the final secret conference on the details of the offensive in the West. The entire Wehrmacht was ordered to be continuously ready to move at twenty-four hours' notice from 5 May, as Hitler was informed.

With the German Army now poised along the Dutch and Belgian borders, ready to unleash its mighty armored force at a moment's notice, on 3 May bad weather postponed 'Yellow.' On the fourth, it was again delayed. On Sunday, the fifth meteorological report again confirmed that bad weather would hamper operations, so the green light was set for Friday, 8 May, instead. On this deadline Hitler told Keitel and Jodl that he was determined not to wait a day longer. He ordered a special time table printed for his headquarters staff.

The timetable showed his Führersonderzug ‘Amerika’ departing from a small station near Berlin on 7 May and arriving the next day in Hamburg en route for an official visit to Oslo. But weather reports confirmed that there was still a strong risk of bad weather that day, so Hitler postponed ‘Yellow’ and the trip to Oslo. Hitler's sudden decision to visit Oslo just before unleashing 'Yellow' surprised both Julius Schaub and Martin Bormann. Yet unbeknown to them extraordinary security precautions had been taken to keep the location of Hitler's new headquarters secret, even from his personal staff.

During the afternoon of 9 May, Hitler and his staff finally left the Chancellery and drove out of Berlin to a small railway station at Finkenkrug. Here, ‘Amerika’ awaited them. At 4:30 p.m., the long train, with its light flak batteries mounted on flat-top wagons at each end, slowly pulled out of the station into the evening dusk. Concealing its direction, ‘Amerika’ first headed north toward Hamburg, but by early evening it moved south and pulled into a little station called Hagenow. Setting off once more, it proceeded south, then west to its real destination. By this time members of staff realized that they were not heading for Oslo after all.

Throughout most of the journey, Hitler was seen to be outwardly calm, but secretly, as the deadline for confirmation of the attack order approached, he became noticeably tense and agitated. By late evening, the codeword ‘Danzig’ was alerted to the troops massing along the frontier to finally order them forward into action.

As the Luftwaffe prepared to reach for the skies over the Low Countries an hour before dawn at 4:25 a.m., "Amerika" reached its destination. Through the carriage window, the platform sign read Euskirchen, a small town near the Holland-Belgium border. Security for the Führer's arrival was very tight, and even a code word for the event had been arranged: ‘Whitsuntide’ (leave approved) signalled the arrival of ‘Amerika’ at Euskirchen station. Out in front of the station, a well-armed FBB unit had taken up positions under cover.

As Hitler and his staff stepped off the train in the semidarkness, his headquarters motor convoy awaited them. For thirty minutes the convoy drove through the rolling countryside, and at 5.00am it finally reached its destination. The area was immediately cordoned off, and Hitler and his staff made their way through the string of security barriers. Passing a high-barbed-wire fence through thick undergrowth and trees, the convoy made its way up into Hitler's new field headquarters, 'Felsennest.'